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### Ideology in Economics

Taking Stock, Looking Ahead

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“Whether because of its parsimony, its long-established position in popular and academic discourse, or because of some set of associated traits which are deemed useful – and not sufficiently conveyed by neighbouring concepts – ideology remains a fixture in the work of political scientists, social psychologists, political anthropologists, sociologists, and historians.” (Gerring 1997, p.961-62).

## 1. Introduction

In one of the most accomplished work on the treatment of the concept of ideology in social sciences, Gerring (1997, p.961-62) noticed that ideology is “a fixture in the work of political scientists, social psychologists, political anthropologists, sociologists, and historians.” Far from disagreeing with him, this present work merely upholds that he quite falsely forgot to mention economists among this list of social scientists. It must however be acknowledged that if the concept of ideology has today a rather clear status in the other social sciences, the same cannot be said of the economic discipline. Indeed, since Meek (1967) and Samuels (1977), no work has taken stock of the treatment of ideology in economics, maybe except Hinich and Munger (1996) who focused on the specific use of the concept in the public choice analysis. This void in the economic literature strongly contrasts with recent seminal works coming from other disciplines like political science (Knight 2006), sociology (Lynch 1994), psychology (Jost et al. 2008) and social sciences in general (Gerring 1997). Furthermore, although some economists such as Douglass North (Denzau and North 1994) and Robert Higgs (2008) assert that taking ideology into account is fundamental for economists, they most often regret the few attention paid by their discipline to it and the feeling of suspicion it inspired in them (Slembeck 2003; Leroux 2004).

This alleged attitude of economists towards ideology have different and sometimes opposite reasons. Indeed, after having invented the word “ideology” in the wake of the French Revolution, the French philosopher Destutt de Tracy<sup>1</sup> and his fellows were contemptuously labeled by Napoleon as “Ideologues” for their “unrealistic” political stances. Since then, the pejorative connotation of the word has been deeply rooted in the popular and sometimes academic discourses. Then the word was really introduced around half a century later in social science by Karl Marx who published with Engels in 1845 in *The German Ideology*, a work that laid the foundations of what would become the Marxist approach of ideology and which Marx specified in *The Poverty of Philosophy* in 1847. But the underlying holist and

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<sup>1</sup> *Mémoire sur la faculté de penser*, 1796.

materialist approach that has long prevailed in social science would not fit the individualistic and rational assumptions of the *homo aeconomicus* model of standard economics. Moreover the strong Marxist connotation of the term ideology led major authors to use alternative words in whole social science (Gerring 1917, p. 962) and especially in economics. For instance Pareto (1917) spoke about “derivation” and Mises (1949) about “world view”.

More recently, another reason for economists to be suspicious towards the concept was supplied by the sociology of knowledge and especially its founder, Karl Mannheim who insisted on the reflexivity of the term. According to the paradox of Mannheim (1936), it is not possible to have a scientific discourse on ideology that would be not itself ideological. Furthermore, the complexity of the notion of ideology that Gerring (1997, p.961-62) presented as a source of interest in other disciplines could be perceived as an obstacle in economics. Indeed, the difficulty to build a formal or empirical analytical tool from a fluctuating and polysemous notion antagonized the ambition of economics to be a hard science. Finally, it is often said, on the contrary, that Schumpeter (1949), one of the first major economists to have been interested in ideology, would have reduced the term to a mere “value judgment” (Katouzian 1980; Leroux 2004), thus depriving the economic debates on ideology of all the deepness of the concept. But all these reasons, whether good or bad, should not minimize the diversity of the economists’ works that the topic has given birth. That led us to think that it is not the concept of ideology that has been minimized by economists but rather the economic works on ideology. However a closer look into these works is very instructive about the evolution of economic science.

Indeed, studying the way a discipline approaches the notion of ideology turns out to be fundamental. And showing why this study is so informative for economists is exactly the purpose of the present paper. Like Knight (2006) who showed the evolution of political science through the treatment in literature of the concept of ideology in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the present paper aims at showing that the treatment of this concept in economics heralds or at least mirrors the internal debates, challenges and evolutions of the whole discipline. Generally speaking, it charts the specific uses of ideology for economics that can be defined either by his subject as the science of exchange or of the allocation of scarce resources or by its standard behavioral hypothesis of *homo aeconomicus* also called the rational choice model. Such a study supposes that the notion of ideology is indeed studied by economists and that it

has been sufficiently done to draw a rather unified approach of ideology in economics. However the current literature does not allow to think so in the absence of a comprehensive study of the treatment of ideology by economists. By providing such as study, the present article supplies aggregation that makes a main requirement of scientific coherence and direction within an expanding literature. But, if an original economic approach of ideology exists, why even the economists who took an interest in the topic asserted that it has remained a minor subject of interest and a major subject of fear in economics?

The fact that economists seem to be unaware of the richness of the study of ideology in their own discipline is probably due to the absence of an appropriate analysis of the various and scattered economic works. The present article shows that there exists a flourishing literature dealing with ideology in various fields of economics but no connection has been established until now. That is probably exactly due to the strong diversity of these works, maybe too far from each other to be mutually aware. That gave rise to narrow uses of the concept in specific fields such as the public choice theory (Hinich and Munger 1996), New Institutional Economics (North 2005), history of economic thought (Katouzian 1980) or economic philosophy (Leroux 2004). As all the scarce analyses of the economic treatment of ideology were in the form of literature survey, that led us to think that the pessimistic conclusions on the little interest of economists were maybe due to the methodology used. Therefore we decided to investigate the issue by means of a quantitative analysis based on bibliometrics, that is to say a set of methods used to study or measure texts and information. This kind of quantitative analysis would provide a more systematic and objective methodology than a traditional narrative literature survey (Stanley 2001). Our bibliometric analysis is based on the articles available on the JSTOR and ECONLIT databases and we deepen the analysis on 246 articles published in 45 top-ranked economics journals on the period 1920-2010, that appear to be representative of the whole economic literature.

The bibliometric analysis reveals that economists have indeed studied the concept of ideology. Since the publication of the first articles on ideology in the 1920s in the economic reviews, the concept has appeared as an important topic in a growing number of articles published in a growing number of top-ranked reviews. It also appears that since the word appeared in the scientific reviews, economic reviews have published a constant and significant part of the total number of articles published in social science. In short, economists

have not been less interested in ideology than other social scientists. A further analyze of the content of our sample of articles reveals a high degree of convergence among economists towards four main approaches of ideology at different times. First, from the 1930s to the 1970s, by opposing ideology with science, economists massively took part in a traditional epistemological debate opened by sociology and philosophy upon the ability of researchers to produce scientific knowledge not affected by ideological biases. By the way, they investigated the scientificity of their own discipline. Second, from the 1960s and as its peak in the 1980s, the economic discipline adopted an original approach of ideology to integrate it into the model of rational choice, thus epitomizing the tendency of economic imperialism. Third, for the last two decades, the economic literature has predominantly followed the traditional approach of ideology in political science on focusing on the political dimension of the concept, making ideology a common empirical tool. Forth, in a looming research agenda, economics has started, through a cognitive approach of ideology, to study the formation of individuals' beliefs and preferences to account for the formation and persistence of institutional equilibrium and the process of change.

The article is structured as follows. The second section presents the bibliometric methodology (2). Then the third section studies whether economists have studied the concept of ideology and to what extent (3). The fourth section proposes to identify and to categorize the main economists' approaches of ideology and the underlying theoretical debates (4). The fifth section concludes (5).

## **2. Bibliographic methodology**

To claim to be more exhaustive and objective than a typical literature survey, we chose to adopt a quantitative type methodology based on the study of a representative sample of the literature. However we cannot resort to a standard meta-analysis often used in economics to assess an existing body of findings in a sample of empirical studies. The nature of information is different in our case because it is not purely quantitative. Indeed, we do not look for a quantifiable relationship between economic variables but we rather have to identify some articles and examine and categorize their literary content, which is qualitative information. To do that, bibliometrics is the commonly used methodology. It is very often used, one the one hand, through citation analysis, for instance to build the reviews' impact factors, and, on the other hand, through content analysis. While the bibliometric method is widespread in

information sciences and experimental behavioral sciences, it has started to be used in economics. It has been most often through citation analysis to study, for example, the impact of economics on other disciplines (Landes and Posner 1993) or of a specific economic field on the whole discipline (Rubin and Chang 2003) or the influence or, more surprisingly, the absence of influence of some authors (Cox and Chung 1991; Rowley 2009). But, in this study, we resort to content analysis, that is to say a set of techniques “for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of [texts]” (Neuendorf 2002, p.10).

But this method is of course not flawless. It raises other difficulties than a traditional literature survey and also requires methodological choices. Indeed, this kind of quantitative study is possible thanks to the evolution of the data processing that enables us to have easy access to numerous scientific works on various electronic databases. But the abundance of unequal information also raises the limits of a bibliometric method. Therefore the first difficulty is inherent to the selection of the set of works among which we will perform our content analysis to build our sample of works dealing with ideology. Shall we look for in books, in scientific reviews? Which ones exactly? On which period? How to define a limited set of works in which we will apply the content analysis? The most important is to have a uniform, continuous database, even if this means losing exhaustively. That would limit biases. The second difficulty lies in the building of the sample of works dealing with *ideology*. How to define and identify the works dealing with *ideology*? The underlying trade-off is between *coverage* and *precision*, both tending to vary inversely (White 1994). We must here conciliate the will of being exhaustive and the difficulty to accurately analyze the content of works selected. A related concern also comes from the fact that, with not sufficiently strict selection criteria, our sample to analyze would be composed of works that would deal with *ideology* only in a trivial or anecdotic way. Thirdly, the last but not least difficulty is to choose an appropriate technique for the text analysis among all the available ones, in order to differentiate and classify the various approaches of *ideology*.

Basically our bibliometric methodology is quite close to the one used by Knight (2006). Indeed, our first methodological choice is to focus on economic journals rather than books because only the formers are quite uniformly available on electronic databases and since they have become the current research medium (Khun 1970). However among all the existing

reviews in economics, only a short part is available on electronic databases. Thus the issue of the choice of the reviews is decisive. Led by the trade-off between the coverage of the whole literature and the precision provided by a limited sample of works, we chose to focus the analysis to the best-ranked reviews, which are supposed to be the most visible and read by economists. Thus we selected 45 out of 56 reviews ranked A<sup>+</sup> in the 2009 AERES<sup>2</sup> ranking in economics. We put aside 11 reviews<sup>3</sup> not available on the JSTOR or ECONLIT databases. The reviews of our sample are presented in appendix (table A.1).

We are aware that such a choice is likely to introduce a bias in our analysis. Indeed, this sample of reviews inevitably glosses over a significant number of works. For instance, the non-ranked reviews appear to be among the most prolific on the ideology topic<sup>4</sup>. This choice also leads us to do without innovative and influent articles from less well ranked new reviews<sup>5</sup>. And a potential bias could stem from the fact that the top-ranked reviews mainly published the works of orthodox economists that are said to minimize the *ideology* topic as compared to the heterodox ones (Samuels, 1971, p.472). Therefore, to make sure of the representativeness of our sample of reviews, we will, on the one hand, compare some of our main findings with the results obtained for the total economic reviews available on JSTOR and, on the other hand, we will refer as much as possible to seminal articles from other reviews that contributed to the study of ideology in economics and that are quoted in the articles in our sample. In spite of these flaws, our sample has the advantage of offering a good trade-off between coverage and precision and of being time-consistent because all the 45 top-ranked reviews are quite old and therefore allows comparison through time.

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<sup>2</sup> The AERES is the French Evaluation Agency for Research and Higher Education. It proposes a ranking of journals in economic, partly based on the *European Reference Index for Humanities*, and which takes into account both the quality judged by an experts committee and the diffusion, through the impact factor, of the reviews. The ranking was said to favor the generalist reviews at the expense of the specialized ones. But this polemic does not concern in the top category labeled A<sup>+</sup>, which take the top generalist and top-field reviews into account.

<sup>3</sup> The journals that we do not take into account in our study are: *World Development*, *Journal of Economic Growth*, *Journal of Economics and Management Strategy*, *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, *International Journal of Production Economics*, *Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice*, *Economics and Philosophy*, *European Economic Review*, *Games and Economic Behavior*, *Health Economics*, *Ecological Economics*. We take the review *History of Political Economy* into account only in the first part of our study but not for the content analysis because the full text is not available on the electronic databases used.

<sup>4</sup> Indeed, *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology* is one of the first reviews to deal with *ideology* as early as the 1920s. *Economic and Political Weekly* is the most prolific review with 84 articles with “ideology”, “ideologies” and “ideological” in their title, abstract or key-words between 1966 and 2004.

<sup>5</sup> For instance the *Journal of Economic Issues*, the *European Journal of Political Economics*, the *Review of African Political Economy* or the *Review of International Political Economy*, which published a significant number of interesting articles on ideology.

To cope with the second difficulty pertaining to the identification of the articles dealing with *ideology*, we chose to pick the articles containing the words “ideology”, “ideologies” or “ideological” in their title or in their abstract or keywords. Such a choice would probably lead us to underestimate the number of works on *ideology* but it prevents us from having articles that make a trivial use of the term and that would not be workable in the rest of our study. As a comparison, in her study, Knight (2006) chose far less restrictive criteria by picking in the whole text extra words such as “ideologue”, “ideologues” but also words that designate a particular ideology, such as “communism”, “fascism” and other closely connected words.

Lastly to tackle the issue of the different approaches of *ideology* in our sample, we chose to classify our articles according to two criteria. First which definition of ideology do they supply and, second, which research question do they tackle, in other words, which literature do they belong to? So as to answer both questions, we need articles that deal with *ideology* in a substantial way. Therefore, at this stage of the analysis, we discard all the articles that refer to ideology in an anecdotic way, which we define as having less than two occurrences of *ideology* in the main text. In the remaining articles, we look for the definition of *ideology* thanks to an electronic research of the word *ideology* in the main text. In numerous articles, an explicit definition is supplied. When it is not the case, we pick the recurring words the most often associated with *ideology*. By gathering these words, some lexical convergences appeared. Based on them, we establish the main categories of definitions. Finally, concerning the research question of each article, it is most often easily identifiable by reading the abstract. Another indication is the citation analysis since authors quote the pioneers of the debate in which they participate. That also enables us to identify the authors who launched new research programs. In this way, it is possible to establish a classification of the approaches and definitions of ideology and to study the evolution of these categories and the underlying debates over the concept of ideology in economics.

### **3. Has “ideology” been studied in economics?**

This section quantitatively examines the widespread assumption according to which economists are not much interested in the concept of *ideology*. More precisely we propose to identify the works on ideology in economic journals and to study the evolution of their number.

Before focusing on our sample articles, the word “ideology” appeared in economic journals more than one century after having been invented. Indeed, in the 1920s, *The American Economic Review (AER)*, *The Quarterly Journal of Economics (QJE)* and the *Journal of Political Economics* published about twenty articles that contained the word in their main text. That can seem late compared to political science (Knight 2006, p.620)<sup>6</sup> and more generally compared to the whole social sciences. Indeed as soon as the 1830s, some reviews in other disciplines<sup>7</sup> published articles that referred to the ideology topic in their main text (see figure 1). Figure 1 presents the evolution of the number of articles referring to ideology and connected words in their main text, published in the total reviews available on JSTOR. It appears that the word started to spread in social science as soon as the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Like in Knight (2006), in figure 1 and in the following ones, the results are presented by decades to smooth out annual fluctuations and to control for changes in format and the number of articles published during a given period.

\*\*\*insert figure 1 here\*\*\*

If we now focus on the 45 reviews of our sample, 30 have published at least one article on the topic of ideology<sup>8</sup>. In these 30 reviews, we identified 246 articles dealing with ideology according to our criteria defined in the second section (see table 2 in appendix for the list of the 246 articles). Figure 2 presents the evolution of the reviews of our sample that published articles dealing with ideology and figure 3 presents the evolution on the number of these articles. It appears from both figures that the first articles focusing on ideology appeared in the 1930s and 1940s in the same review, *the AER*, with especially the seminal article of Schumpeter “Science and Ideology” in 1949. During the 1950s, two other journals, *The QJE* and *Economic Development and Cultural Change* addressed the topic by publishing 4 articles on the topic. During the following ten years, the topic of ideology still staid relatively marginal with 6 articles and the participation of *The Journal of Economic History* in the study of ideology. From the 1970s, we can consider that the issue began to spread in the literature because nine new reviews published articles on ideology. We can assume that until then,

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<sup>6</sup> Knight (2006, p.620): “The steep increase in attention to ideology starting in the late 1940s and early 1950s is startling”.

<sup>7</sup> Indeed the word first appeared in a review of philosophy in 1830. Then it appeared in the 1860s in anthropology and ethnology, in the 1870s in philology, in the 1890s in sociology and history and in 1900s in political science.

<sup>8</sup> But two of them, *Journal of Urban Economics* and *Journal of Health Economics* published articles after the beginning of the present analysis and are therefore not taken into account.

although the study of ideology by economists progressively got under way in reviews, this research took place at least as much in books. It is for instance obvious in Meek (1967) and Samuels (1977). The former studied the concept of ideology in the history of economic thought<sup>9</sup>. The latter listed more than 30 books tackling the “ideology” issue in economics, published between 1951 and 1975 (Samuels 1977, p.481-484). As, for long, the research had been more through books than articles (Khun 1970), we probably underestimate the number of works during the beginning of our period.

\*\*\*insert figure 2 here\*\*\*

\*\*\*insert figure 3 here\*\*\*

At any rate, the 1980s appeared as a turning point during which ideology became an important topic with more than 30 articles focusing on ideology and stemming from about 30 different reviews. The trend is confirmed in the following decade with 82 articles. This sharp increase can partly be explained by the growing interest of the reviews of political economy<sup>10</sup> epitomized by *Public Choice*<sup>11</sup> that published the half of the articles of our sample in the 1990s. The number of articles kept on increasing during the 2000s to reach at least hundred articles. As the databases generally do not supply the volumes of reviews for the latest years, it is not possible to assess the real number of articles. One could assume that the growing increase in the attention of economists to ideology is to attribute to the increasing number of reviews in our sample. However that turns out to be false as figures 4 and 5 shows. Figure 4 shows an increase in the number of articles weighted by the number of reviews publishing these articles. Figure 5 also shows an increase in the number of articles weighted by the total number of reviews of our sample. Indeed, most of the new reviews that entered the AERES ranking are specialized ones and have not said any word about “ideology.” So the decreasing share of the generalist journals in our sample could be expected decrease the share of works on ideology in total works. But this tendency is compensated for by the emergence of specialized reviews, especially in political economy, which focused their attention on the study of ideology.

\*\*\*insert figure 4 here\*\*\*

\*\*\*insert figure 5 here\*\*\*

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<sup>9</sup> And especially in the books *History of Economic Analysis*, 1954 by Schumpeter, *Economic Philosophy*, 1964 by Johan Robinson and *Political Economy*, 1963 by Oscar Lange.

<sup>10</sup> Outside our sample, other reviews of political economy have been interested in the topic, such as *Economics and Politics* and the *European Journal of Political Economy*.

<sup>11</sup> Outside our sample, other reviews of political economy was interested in the topic, such as the *European Journal of Political Economy* or *Economic and Politics*.

One could also object to the assertion according to which ideology has become an important topic in economics with only one hundred of articles in the top-ranked reviews during the last decade. But one must keep in mind that we voluntarily adopted very restraining criteria to identify articles of our sample in order to study them more deeply in a second stage. Thus our methodology widely underestimates the number of economic works on ideology. For instance with the criteria adopted by Knight (2006)<sup>12</sup>, we would have found around 20 000 articles in total with more than 4500 articles in the 1990s (see figure 6). And like Knight (2006, p.620) did for political science, we could then notice an increase in attention among economists to ideology in the late 1940s-1950s. It is also interesting to notice that, with such criteria, since the 1920s, the total number of articles on ideology in economics has always represented approximately 10% of the total number of articles on ideology in all disciplines available on JSTOR. Indeed figure 7 shows the numbers of articles that refer to *ideology* in both economic reviews and the total reviews available on *JSTOR*. We can deduce from it that economists have not been less interested in ideology than other social scientists.

\*\*\*insert figure 6 here\*\*\*

\*\*\*insert figure 7 here\*\*\*

This first stage of our bibliometric analysis allows to conclude that ideology has been a significant and growing concern for economists, in the top-ranked reviews as well as in the whole literature. It has been the object of more and more articles in a growing number of reviews. If these works were concentrated in a small number of reviews until the 1960s, the topic spread, during the following decade, in a significant number of reviews. And most of the reviews of our sample have already published at least one article focusing on ideology. Even if we can notice an increase in the attention to *ideology* as soon as the 1950s, the “boom” of the number of articles occurred in the 1980s and we listed more than hundred articles with ideology as an important topic during the early 2000s. If we adopt less restrictive criteria, we realize that the works in economics about *ideology* are not marginal compared to the whole economic literature and to the total works on ideology in other disciplines.

#### **4. The main economic approaches of ideology**

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<sup>12</sup> We performed the research in all the economic journals indexed by JSTOR mentioning ideology and its cognates in the whole text over the same period.

Once we know that *ideology* has attracted the economists' attention, the most interesting point is to know what they have said about it and for what purpose they have resorted to it. Thus this section proposes to examine the evolution of the approaches of ideology in the articles of our sample. To paraphrase Matossian (1958, p.228), to understand an approach of ideology, it is important to determine what problems its initiators are trying to solve. That is why, in each article, we look for the supplied definition of ideology and the question treated by the author. Out of the 246 articles of our sample, 171 supply explicit or implicit definitions, which could be categorized by inference according to the technique described in section 2 (see table 2 in appendix for the category of each article). Among the other 75 articles that refer to the term only in an anecdotic way, 60 do not refer to the main research questions identified in the rest of the sample and are thus not workable. They most often focus on the study of a specific ideology such as gender or racist ideologies. Once we have identified the definitions through the method detailed in section 2, it emerges four main groups of approaches that turn out to refer to four main stages of economics.

Before presenting these approaches, we can notice a first originality of the economic approach(es). The economic literature does not seem to have resorted to the original definition provided by Marx, contrary to other social sciences. Among the three main features of the Marxist approach that are the social origin of our ideas supposed to come from our material conditions (*materialism*) (1), the function of ideology to serve the private interests of the ruling class (2) and the idea of a fallacy inherent to ideology that distinguishes it from science (3), only the last one was taken up by the authors of our sample. Indeed, out of the 246 sample articles, only two (Bendix 1957; Foley 1975) consider ideology in accordance with the first two core concepts of the Marxist approach. In fact, the individualistic approach of the rational choice model that has dominated the neoclassical tradition in economics is obviously not compatible with the holist approach of the Marxist definition. On the other hand, a significant part of works in economics has progressively put into question the assumption of self-interest of the rational choice model, thus leaving room for behaviors not led by the strict private interests and therefore opposing the second core elements of the Marxist approach. That is rather the third element, the fallacy inherent to ideology, which gave birth to a plethoric literature in economics.

#### *4.1 The first approach: ideology VS science*

By proceeding to the content analysis of the sample articles, we identified a first set of definitions of ideology based on words belonging to the lexical field of science<sup>13</sup>, systematically associated with the idea of mistake<sup>14</sup>. In short, they bring ideology into conflict with objectivity and assimilate it with a bias in the scientific knowledge. They appeared in our sample with the oldest article, of Homan (1932) who speaks about “a negation of systematic theory by reason of its erroneous ideology and of its irrelevance to problems of control” (Homan 1932, p.12). They are present with some variations in all the sample articles coming from the *QJE* and the *AER* during the first two decades, especially in Grushy (1939), Schumpeter (1949) and Streeten (1954). The evolution of this category of definitions is presented in figure 8 that shows the evolution of the various groups of definitions of our sample. It appears that the majority of our sample articles use this kind of definition during the first decades of our study until the last 1950s and then this approach progressively disappeared from the literature<sup>15</sup>. This decrease can be explained not only because of the emergence of new reviews that supplied other definitions but also because traditional reviews that initially proposed this kind of definitions changed their approach. That is obvious in the *AER* that played a pioneering role in the *VS science* approach in the first decade of our study and that then supplied other types of definitions from the 1970s. In any case, it turned out to be a high degree of definitional convergence until the 1950s towards the *VS science* approach.

\*\*\*insert figure 8 here\*\*\*

This approach of ideology corresponded to a specific theoretical debate in economics that came from the traditional epistemic issue of the production process of scientific knowledge. As Mannheim (1936, p.18) put it, “the concern with the problems and pitfalls involved in the search for valid knowledge has constituted more than a negligible part of the works of a long line of brilliant thinkers through Hume<sup>16</sup>, Bentham, Mill<sup>17</sup> and Spencer”. Taken up by Marx in 1845, in *the German Ideology*, who considered the classical economics as an ideology that justifies the interests of the ruling class, the question, which spread into social science, became: how to make science in spite of the searcher’s subjectivity? The question gave birth

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<sup>13</sup> such as *theory, knowledge, scientific, research, researcher, reason, finding, doctrine, assumption, economists, sociologists*.

<sup>14</sup> with words such as *erroneous, irrelevance, preconception, bias, prejudices, distortion, enslave, lie, perversion, unquestioned, anomalies*.

<sup>15</sup> Other reviews outside our sample contributed to this approach like the *Scottish Journal of Political Economy* with the classical article of Macfie (1963) and the *Journal of Economic Issues*.

<sup>16</sup> Hume D. (1927) *Enquires concerning the Human Understanding and concerning the Principle of Morals*, LA Selby-Bigge, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, Oxford.

<sup>17</sup> Mill J. S. (1850) *A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive* Harper and Brothers, New York.

to major contributions like the theory of *derivations* of Pareto (1917), who considered socialism as ideological in 1902-1903 in *Socialist Systems*, the study of the role of “value judgment” in science of Schumpeter (1949) or the more neglected study of “world view” of Mises (1949) who denounced the ideological biases of Marxism. All these works had in common to try to locate the ideological biases in the adverse theory. From this critical and polemical use of ideology, the concept clearly appeared as a demarcation criterion that sharply separated knowledge and error.

This undertaking is echoed in our sample through two main debates. The first one focused on the location of the non-scientific biases in economic discipline while the second one investigated the possibility to find a valid scientific procedure that would not be distorted by ideologies. Concerning the first debate, the question in our sample was to know which field of economics or which concept is scientific or not. The Marxian theory, but also the use of mathematics in economics and the theory of value focused a significant part of the attention of our sample articles<sup>18</sup>. According to the other debate, at one extreme, some authors like Macfie (1963), in the vein of Pareto (1917) and Schumpeter (1949), considered that ideology staves off any attempt of scientific knowledge, at the other, ideology would be necessary for scientists by “proposing a certain selection of problem for study” (Smolinsky 1973, p.1192) or by providing economists with “preexisting thought structures or frames of reference” which “guide [their] selection, analysis, and interpretation of economic facts” (Grushy 1939, p.62).

In most of the cases, the point was to reflect on the scientificity of the economic discipline and especially of the adverse theory, thus making *ideology* a polemical or critical concept. In spite of the attempt of some authors to alleviate its polemical quality and even to make it useful and part and parcel of the scientific process, generally speaking, economists reached a deadlock. They did not manage to move away from the traditional negative connotation of the concept. By the way, they came up against the Mannheim paradox related to the reflexivity of the term. Realizing thus the danger of a negative definition, opposed to truth, some of the above mentioned authors of our sample refused to emphasize the opposition with science. For instance, Randall (1985, p.1024) asserted that “the sharp separation of ideology from knowledge is not thought possible or especially desirable.” The progressive disappearance of

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<sup>18</sup> Homan (1932) examined the institutional economics, Gershenkron (1969) the *laissez-faire* ideology, Hirshman (1982) capitalism, Smolinski (1973) Marxism, Caldwell (2000) socialism and Streeten (1954) economic concepts such as utilities or social income.

this approach from the 1950's in our sample and in the whole literature undoubtedly corresponded to this awareness and probably to the fact that economics progressively stopped to look into its own scientificity and started to take it for granted.

#### 4.2 *The second category of definitions: ideology VS interest*

The second significant trend of definitions that appeared in literature brought ideology into conflict no longer with science but with the notion of self-interest or more generally of rationality in the sense of the rational choice theory. It therefore reverses the relationship between ideology and interest of the Marxist definition, in which ideology served private material interests. This approach most often does not provide explicit definitions of ideology but can however be identified in our sample by the words systematically associated with the term ideology<sup>19</sup>. The basic idea of this kind of definitions, well conveyed by Levitt (1996, p.428), is that an ideological behavior entails a loss of a private profit. However a few authors supply a more accurate definition such as Kalt and Zupan (1984, p.281), who analyze the traditional opposition between ideology and interest in economics and emphasize the “altruistic” and “moralistic” dimensions of ideology related to the notion of “*public interest*”<sup>20</sup>. Indeed, ideology would “refer to [...] personal definitions of the public interest, pursued as a consumption good that yields satisfactions in the form of moral sentiments” (Kalt and Zupan 1990, p.104). More generally, this approach supplies a residual definition of ideology that is all that cannot be explained by the strict self-interest assumption of the rational choice theory.

As soon as the 1930s, Keynes (1936, p.383-384) already opposed “vested interests” and “ideas” and this opposition appeared for the first time in our sample with the article of Mason (1963, p.2) who proposed to analyze political decisions “*under the headings of interests and ideologies*”. We can see on figure 8 that this approach appeared in the 1960s but really spread in the literature in the 1980s and especially from the reference article of Kau and Rubin

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<sup>19</sup> Such as: *self-interest, benefits, profits or opportunistic behavior, venality, career goals.*

<sup>20</sup> Kalt and Zupan (1984, p.281): “Pure ideology, if it exists at all, is the manifestation of altruism in the political sector. [...] Indeed ideology appears to typically center around the equity side (rights and distributional assignments) of the economists' equity-efficiency dichotomy; [...] In the jargon of recent research, the purported social objectives of political actors have been termed "ideology." Political ideologies are more or less consistent sets of normative statements as to best or preferred states of the world. Such statements are moralistic and altruistic in the sense that they are held as applicable to everyone, rather than merely to the actor making the statements. Accordingly, political ideologies are taken here to be statements about how government can best serve their proponents' conceptions of the public interest.»

(1979). In fact this approach became a majority in our sample in the 1980s and gave rise to a new strong definitional convergence. It supplied more articles in the 1990s but not compared to the other set of definitions. We also notice that, whereas these definitions are provided by new reviews, the older reviews such as the *AER* adopted this approach at the expense of the *VS science definitions*. Moreover, if we consider that the approach pertains more generally to the opposition between ideology and rationality, we can include in this approach several articles of our sample that oppose a non-rational, ideological vote with a purely rational one based on “the professional qualifications, honesty, integrity or charisma of the candidates” (Andina-Díaz 2006, p.353), in other words the real valence or competence of a candidate (Bernhardt et al 2011; Krishna and Morgan 2011). This literature stands for a variant of the approach based on the irrational feature associated with ideology.

All this trend of definitions pertains to a specific problem in economics. After having examined its own ability to produce scientific knowledge through the previous approach, the economic science scrutinized in a further step its basic behavioral assumption namely the rational choice model. Facing the failures of this model to predict some observed behaviors, the standard economic theory had to account for what sounded like “dissonance”, “anomaly” or “paradox” (Sen 2002, p.24; North 1992, p.479; Vanberg 2008). Indeed in some situations of collective choice and more generally in politics, the rational choice model has seemed to be incapable of providing an account of some individuals’ motivations and behaviors. Therefore a significant part of literature aimed at knowing in which situations and to what extent individuals tended to adopt such irrational, benevolent or ideological behaviors, sometimes intending to remedy the flaws of the behavioral model of the standard economics. That gave birth to “revisionist strategies” consisting in slightly modifying the basic model of economic man in order to account for the observed behavioral anomalies. That allowed to extend the explicative power of economics to new fields such as politics, what was called “economic imperialism”. To improve the predictive power of their model, it appears that standard economists were far more conciliatory with regard to the self-interest assumption than to the rationality assumption (Sen 2002; Vanberg 2008). This trend concerned especially two issues: the paradox of collective action (Olson 1965) and the seeming uninterested individuals’ behavior in the political field- whether it be the paradox of voting, or of campaign contribution or the assumption of general interest of politicians (Mueller 2003).

This is reflected in our sample first with a significant number of articles that use the concept of ideology to overcome the paradox of collective action. Thus we noticed two kinds of “revisionist strategies” to explain the individually irrational participation to the provision of public goods. A first strategy drove some authors to consider ideology as an external constraint in the utility maximization problem. The constraint can be of religious type in order to account for work (in)efficiency (Izraeli and Groll 1980; Kimhi 1998) or suicide attack (Wintrobe 2006) or of political type to explain the revolutionary strategies (Roemer 1985) or the appointment process (Nixon 2004). A second and more common strategy was to add ideological motivations, namely non-interested, along with motivations related to material interests as arguments of the individuals’ objective function thus considering ideology as an end *per se*. Most of the authors who did so referred to North (1981, p.45-58) who discussed the role of ideology to ameliorate free-riding behavior when people have no material individual incentive to participate in the provision of a public good. By interpreting ideology as a “substitute for material incentives” (Mahoney 2003, p.236) that refer to “the utility which an individual obtains from identifying his interests with that of a group” (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1992, p.420), the articles of our sample explained, in an “enlarged” rational choice framework, unionization (Barbash 1943; Cell 1980; Fones-Wolf and Fones-Wolf 1981; Haberfeld 1995), strike success (Friedman 1988; Esteban and Ray 1997; Dasgupta and Kanbur 2007), international relations (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1992; Mahoney 2003) and more generally the provision of public goods (Mestelman and Feeny 1988).

According to our sample, another part of the literature looked into the role of ideology as a determinant of choice by investigating the behavior of politicians. A huge part of our sample, more than 50 articles, studied the relative part of ideological and interested motivations in the behavior of political representatives and whether this part varies according to some situations. More precisely, the question was to know if, in period of election or, on the contrary, when representatives are immune to any electoral sanction, they change their behavior. From the mid-1980s, the studies focused on representatives’ voting patterns in the US Congress (Kau and Rubin 1979; Kau and Rubin 1984; McGuire and Ohsfeldt 1986; Crain et al. 1986) and gave birth to the “shirking literature” that studied, in a formal principal-agent model, to what extent the elected representatives deviate from the implicit contract with their voters by voting not in accordance with the preferences of their constituency but with their own ideology. This issue gave birth to both formal and empirical studies in which ideology was measured as the

residues of the pure economic or electoral interests. Outside a principal-agent framework, other articles of our sample studied the relative importance of political-ideological factors and economic factors represented by campaign contributions or interest groups<sup>21</sup>. Although this approach gave rise to a strong quantity of empirical as well formal studies, it seemed to be inconclusive concerning the relative parts of ideology and interest that lead the politicians' behavior and the specific issues on which representatives vote more ideologically (Kau and Rubin 1993, p.151<sup>22</sup>; Mueller 2003, p.489<sup>23</sup>).

Besides this difficulty to reach a consensus on its research agenda, this second approach of ideology has been much criticized because it provided a residual definition of ideology, as what does not tally with the self-interest assumption or more scarcely the rationality assumption of the rational choice theory. A debate related to the appropriate definition and measure of ideology emerged in the shirking literature that wondered whether with a residual definition, the role of ideology in representatives' behavior would have not been overestimated because what was considered as ideology would be mere omitted interests (Peltzman 1984, p.210; Seltzer 1995, p.1333; Davis and Porter 1989; Goff and Grier 1993; Kau and Rubin 1993). Thus Kau and Rubin (1982, p.278) were among the first to argue in favor of "a measure of ideology independent of economic interest". In the same vein, Uslander (1997, p.243) proposed to give up the "shirking models based upon residualization" in favor of a "partisan approach" of ideology. That is why, from the 1990s, this approach has slide in relative size compared to other approaches (see figure 8). Although this approach represented a significant step compared to the previous approach in the shaping of *ideology* as an analytical tool for economists, it conserves some flaws of the latter. Indeed, ideology remained defined in a critical and evaluative way according to the self-interest criteria of the rational choice model. Moreover, referring to an irrational behavior, ideology kept its negative connotation.

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<sup>21</sup> They focus on the voting pattern of representatives on different issues such as public spending (Hird 1993;; Van Dalen and Swank 1996; Galli and Rossi 2002; Winer et al 2008;), redistributive and fiscal policies (Kau and Rubin 2002; Sobel and Wagner 2004), public debt (Neck and Getzner 2001) but also on free-trade/protectionist laws (Kahane 1996; Kang and Green 1999; Irwin and Kroszner 1999) and privatization/liberalization (Ohsfeldt and Gohmann 1992; Ramírez and Eigen-Zucchi 2001; Christoffersen and Paldam 2003; Duso and Seldeslachts 2009).

<sup>22</sup> Kau and Rubin (1993, p.151): "The [...] question has been confused; some think that ideology and shirking are identical, although they are logically separate categories. We show that even if ideo-logical shirking exists, it is relatively unimportant. We also show that self interested (non-ideological) shirking exists."

<sup>23</sup> In a survey on the determinants of voting patterns of representatives, Mueller (2003, p. 489) seems to conclude that, even and especially on seemingly high ideological issues with no major economic stakes (like child labor), the representatives' votes are led by economic factors.

#### 4.3 The third category of definitions: the “partisan approach”

A third significant group of definitions emerged from the content analysis. Like for the *VS interest definitions*, no explicit definition is provided but it is identifiable by recurring terms associated with the word ideology<sup>24</sup>. These terms systematically refer to the political dimension of ideology and more precisely to a spatial position on a left-right or liberal-conservative spectrum, according to a narrow interpretation of the Downsian conception of ideology (Downs 1957). This partisan definition came from political science in which it has become a majority (Knight 2006), and was progressively adopted by economists facing the mentioned weaknesses of the *VS interest* approach. Contrary to both previous approaches, the partisan definitions are cleansed of any pejorative connotation and normative innuendo. Ideology is no longer what is not scientific or rational and that should be so. It is neither longer defined as compared to non-ideological forms. From a critical concept in contradiction with science or rationality, it became a neutral concept. The flip side of defining ideology in such a positive and non-evaluative way is that the concept is deprived of a big deal of its richness to be reduced to the mere partisan or political affiliation of people.

Regarding our sample of articles, although a very few definitions of this kind started to appear from the 1960s, they really spread in literature in the 1990s to stand for a huge majority of definitions in the 2000s (see figure 8). Like Knight (2006, p.623) for political science, we observe a current definitional convergence in economics towards the partisan/partisan approach of ideology. We also notice that this convergence is not to attribute to a cohort effect with the entrance of new reviews in our sample but to a real conversion of the former proponents of the *VS interest definitions*. Indeed, the same reviews that published during the previous decades works based on the first and second approaches of ideology, have widely resorted to the spatial Downsian definition. For instance, even *Public Choice* that initiated the opposition between ideology and interest has widely adopted the partisan spatial approach from the 1990s.

This Downsian spatial approach of ideology pertains to a traditional debate in political science and History that have opposed the “convergence” hypothesis and the “politics matter” hypothesis (Imbeau et al. 2001). According to the former, differences among countries in

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<sup>24</sup> Such as: *political, party, partisan, position, sympathy, affiliation, tendency, right-left, liberal-conservative.*

political ideology, as well as in institution and culture do not matter when it comes to explaining policy outputs, because of the industrialization process in western countries (Thomas 1980) or technological determinism (Skinner 1976). On the contrary, according to the latter, variations in partisan variables explain variations in policy outputs (Castles and McKinlay 1979). This research question gave birth to a plethora of empirical literature in the framework of the partisan theory (Hibbs 1977) that was allowed by a simple spatial definition of ideology easily translating into a quantifiable measure. Knight (2006, p.623) explained that the success of the partisan approach in political science is probably due to the ascension of quantitative methodology over the last half of the twentieth century but also because of its simplification and intelligibility in the scientific discourse. We can assume that the strong convergence in economics towards this approach for the past two decades is probably due to the same reasons. But which to which problem peculiar to economics this approach of ideology corresponds?

At first sight, the partisan approach presents only an empirical interest in economics that consists in studying the effect of government's political affiliation on the economic aspect of the policy outcomes. Although this study is related to the research question of the *VS interest* approach, they are indeed different. For the former, it came to knowing whether politicians behave only in an interested way. For the partisan approach, it comes to measuring, without denying the importance of economic factors, the effect of political ideology on economic outcomes. Like in our sample, a wide empirical literature studied the effect of the government's political color or political fragmentation on wide range of policies such as public spending (Borge 1995; Cusack 1997; Tellier 2006; Potrafke 2009), redistributive and fiscal policies (Borge and Rattso 1997; Perotti and Kontopoulos 2002; Tavares 2004), public debt (Seitz 2000; Balassone and Giordano 2001) but also on free-trade or protectionist laws (Brady et al. 2002; Dutt and Mitra 2006) and privatization, liberalization (Figueiredo 2005; Bel and Fageda 2009). A smaller literature in the field of Law and Economics investigated the independence of justice by assessing to what extent the cases outcomes are influenced by the judge's political ideology (Ashenfelter et al. 1995; Lim 2000; Revesz 2000; Langer 2003; Smith 2007; Martin and Quinn 2007). Generally speaking, this literature would have reached

a consensus (Kau and Rubin 1993, p.151) to uphold that political ideology does matter but that is not so overwhelming (Schmidt 1996; Imbeau et al. 2001)<sup>25</sup>.

However the stakes are not only empirical but indeed theoretical. The theoretical debate pertains to the rationality assumption of the rational choice model and especially the individuals' learning process and the possibility to learn in politics. The "convergence" hypothesis would be in line with the standard economic theory that predicts the homogenisation of the learning patterns when individuals face the same information. On the contrary, the persistence of two different interpretation and action patterns, a leftwing one and a rightwing one, represents a puzzle for the standard economic theory. Facing the same reality, totally rational individuals should correct their learning patterns by a trial and error process. The problem becomes more accurate when considering the assumption in the partisan literature over the agents' expectations that determinate the duration of the effects of the political decisions. Under the rational expectation assumption, agents immediately anticipate the policies' effects, making them ineffective (Hibbs 1977) while, under the adaptive expectation assumption (Alesina 1987), the government can work on the national economy. But this effect is never lasting because the economic actors quickly correct their expectations. In short, according to the partisan spatial approach, political ideology can be explained only by a failure in the learning process, thus putting into question the second and more critical pillar of the standard behavioural model in economics. After some arrangements with the self-interest assumption enabled by the *VS interest* approach, this new approach of ideology seems to served as a huge setback for the standard economic behavioural model. Therefore, in spite of the neutrality of the partisan type definitions, it remains difficult to integrate the concept of ideology into the economic theory without sacrificing the funding rationality assumption of the economic man model.

The failure to totally rehabilitate ideology according to the standard economic theory is probably due to the oversimplification of the spatial definitions. They are said to derive from the original Downsian approach who considered ideology as a low-cost signal about future voting patterns on a wide variety of issues about which voters are rationally less than perfectly informed (Downs 1957). We easily notice that the over-simplification made by the partisan

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<sup>25</sup> However both analyses naturally do not take into account the latest advancements of the partisan literature that tends to comfort the "ideology matters" hypothesis.

approach lost the gist of the original Downsian conception of ideology. The problem of this simplification is that it focused only on one part of the definition, namely the position of the politician on the political spectrum. It neglects the other basic part of the definition on the reasons of this behavior, the low cost of the signal supplied by this spatial position in a context of imperfect information (Hinich and Munger 1996, p.2). By forgetting that adopting an ideological behavior is first and foremost rational according to Downs (1957) in the sense that this allowed to save the prohibitive costs of collecting information, this simplification led to a paradoxical situation. Indeed, if we neglect the informative function of ideology of supplying information and of allowing communication in politics, ideology is no longer rational and becomes even the problem to cope with in the relationship between voters and their representatives. Whether one considers the role of signaling in an uncertain and imperfect information political world or not, ideological behavior can be interpreted either as “shirking” and a plague for representative democracies or as “signaling” that streamline the democratic process (Nelson 2002, p.519). Therefore some authors proposed to come back to the initial Downsian approach focusing on information to reevaluate and explain the seeming irrational feature of ideology. It gave birth to a new strategy to rationalize ideology according the rational choice model. By relaxing the assumption of substantive rationality and by assimilating costly and scarce information to a good *per se* (Arrow 1971; Stigler 1971), it becomes rational to be ideological.

#### *4.4 The forth category of definitions: the “cognitive approach”*

This concern to rationalize ideological behaviors gave rise to a fourth and last set of definitions based on the informative function of ideology. As opposed to the previous substantive definitions of ideology, the “cognitive” approach has supplied procedural definitions, focusing on the process of the mind i.e. how humans perceive, remember, learn and think about information. This approach is identifiable in our sample by inference from words related to information and more generally the human information handling process<sup>26</sup>.

This approach first appeared in our sample in the late 1950s with Matossian (1958, p.218)<sup>27</sup> who developed the ideology’s role of “self-definition”, “description” and “imperative”. It

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<sup>26</sup> Such as *information, informative, signal, cognition, cognitive, interpretation, interpret, perception, description, prescription, (self-) definition, pattern, system.*

<sup>27</sup> Matossian (1958, p.218) : “Ideology may be defined as a pattern of ideas which simultaneously provides for its adherents: (1) a self-definition, (2) a description of the current situation, its background, and what is likely to

reappeared in the 1970s with Lau and Frey (1971, p.21-22)<sup>28</sup> who assimilated ideology with a preference ordering over the set of possible alternatives and with Brunner and Meckling (1977, p.73)<sup>29</sup> that stresses “the informative value” of ideology through cognitive procedures. Whereas these definitions seem to be marginal in literature in view of our sample, it obviously developed in the last 1990s and in the 2000s, as we can notice on figure 8. Among these definitions, we can notice that some of them insist on the ideology’s positive role to provide people with patterns to interpret information while others focus on the normative function of ideology to supply individuals with behavioral patterns based on rules in specific situations. The authors that focus on the descriptive function often propose definitions closed to the original comprehensive definition of Downs in terms of signaling. That led Wright (1993, p. 104) to assert that “rather than becoming informed about every issue[...], voters can vote for politicians whose general ideological outlook is similar to their own.” Thus it is in politicians’ interest to maintain their ideological reputations. An ideological reputation acts as a “hostage” or “brand name.” Because individuals have little incentive to monitor their representatives’ voting record, an ideological reputation provides a signal as to how they will vote in the future (Lott 1987; Seltzer 1995, p. 1305). We find in our sample, other articles that dwell on this aspect of ideology (Dougan and Munger 1989; Wright 1993; Wärneryd 1994, Bonilla 2004). On the other hand, other definitions highlight the normative role of ideology, by assimilating it either as an order of possible social states (Lau and Frey 1971, p.21-22; Bisin and verdier 2000, p.7) or as “supreme values” (Bernholz 2001, p.35; Bernholz 2006, p.224) or “higher-order beliefs” (Hoff and Stiglitz 2010, p.11).

By taking cognition into account, this approach allows a better understanding of the process of change since, through examining individual choice, it accounts for the formation of collective beliefs that can stabilize or generate equilibrium. In other words, the purpose of the approach is to explain the role of beliefs in situations of change and inertia. As soon as one starts to consider the assumption of imperfect information, the model of rational choice is no longer able to explain changes in preferences, tastes or beliefs, considered as stable (Stringham and Hummel 2010), and is neither able to predict equilibrium situations. Indeed,

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follow, and (3) various imperatives which are “deduced” from the foregoing. In ideology there is a strong tendency to merge fact and value, to superimpose upon “things as they are” the things that are desired.”

<sup>28</sup> Lau and Frey (1971, p.21-22): “government is assumed to possess a complete preference ordering over the set of possible alternative social states based on its ideology.”

<sup>29</sup> Brunner and Meckling (1977, p.73): “Whatever the ideological influences at work, the informative value of a hypothesis can only be judged by appropriate cognitive procedures.”

the mere rational expectations lead to a situation in which all is possible, with the occurrence of multitude of possible equilibrium. Taking into account the process of ideologies' formation and their crystallization into shared mental models (Denzau and North 1994)<sup>30</sup> can enable us to explain the persistence of institutional equilibrium and the passage from an equilibrium to another. The integration of ideology into the explanation of the process of change is mainly to attribute to North. He insisted on the shared feature of ideology to emphasize the phenomenon of "ideological conformism" that reduces the cost of maintaining order by avoiding the cost of sanction mechanisms of deviant behavior (North 2005). In this case, the institutional equilibrium is strengthened by ideology. North and coauthors also propose to explain the process of change and especially institutional change through the formation and evolution of ideologies<sup>31</sup> (Mantzavinos et al 2004).

Contrary to the other above approaches, the cognitive approach can no longer consider ideology as a mere fact but has to explain its formation and its effects in terms of change or inertia. Like Hinich et al (1998, p.404), a substantiate part of our sample articles addresses the issue of "stability and change in a macropolitical context" in a "tradition of thought on dynamic processes". Indeed, some articles propose an endogenous theory of ideology in which ideology interacts with another variable such as economic policy (Chai 1998; Lau and Frey 1971), party platforms (Poutvaara 2003) or opinion polls (Cukierman 1991). In these theories, ideology is explained by the circular effects with the other variable, but is also merely explained in our sample by the formation of the economic beliefs of the economists (Caplan 2002) and of voters (Caplan 2006), by media (Schulz and Weimann 1989; Bovitz et al. 2002; Andina-Díaz 2007; Bernhardt, Krasa and Polborn 2008; Hargittai et al 2008) or by political institutions (Besley and Case 2003; Bernhardt et al. 2004; Schultz 2008). All these articles have in common to focus on the cognitive feature of ideology to explain the formation of ideology and its effect on formal (political) institutions.

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<sup>30</sup> In a reference article on ideology, written with Arthur Denzau, he specifies his definition by considering ideologies as "the shared framework of mental models that groups of individuals possess that provide both an interpretation of the environment and a prescription as to how that environment should be structured" (Denzau et North 1994, p.4). North initially defined ideology as "the subjective frameworks that individuals possess to explain the world around them. Ideologies contain an essential normative element; that is, they explain both the way the world is and the way it ought to be. [...] There are usually elements of an organized structure that make them an economizing device for receiving and interpreting information" (North 1992, p.484).

<sup>31</sup> Denzau and North (1994, p.23): "But many of the changes we wish to understand are social, such as changes in informal institutions or ideologies".

Other articles of our sample study the possible opposite role, the “reinforcement effect” of ideology on informal institutions, either in the economics of transition, where ideology would slowdown the reform process (Wolgin 1997; Jing’an 1987), or in the study of cultural or social transmission, where ideology promotes social rigidity (Bisin and verdier 2000; Hoff and Stiglitz 2010). In any case, when focusing on individuals’ cognitive process, ideology appears as a central concept to understand the formation and persistence of institutional equilibrium. Without depriving the concept from all its richness, like the partisan definitions did, this approach makes ideology an effective analytical tool for economists. This approach goes further than the partisan spatial approach because it adopts a procedural approach of ideology able to explain the formation of ideology and to endogeneize the concept in order to explain a wider range of phenomena. But it also probably contains the most significant criticism of the rational choice theory thought the prescriptive or normative feature of ideology. By emphasizing the fact that individuals can adopt behaviors led by moral rules or ethical values, it denies the consequentialist assumption of the rational choice model.

## **5. Conclusion**

The present article proposed to take stock of the treatment of the concept of ideology in economics. Three main results emerged from this study. First, from the 1920s-30s, economists have shown a growing and significant interest in the concept of ideology. Second, this interest has given rise to four well-identified approaches of ideology at different times. And third, these four generations of approaches enlightened and undoubtedly contributed to the evolution of economic science. More precisely, we use an original bibliometric methodology to study the treatment of the concept of ideology in the economic reviews available on the JSTOR and ECONLIT databases. We focused our analyze on 45 top-ranked reviews and especially 246 articles with ideology as a main topic. It first appeared that, contrary to what is usually thought, the notion of ideology has been more and more present in economic literature, in a growing number of articles published in a growing number of economic reviews. It seems also that, although economists have been interested in *ideology* a few decades later than the other social scientists, from then, namely the 1920s, they have produced a constant and significant part of the total works on *ideology* in the whole social sciences.

A content analysis of the sample articles revealed that four main approaches of ideology prevailed in economics at different times. Through a technique of inference, we identified four groups of definitions supplied in the articles. First, following a long tradition in science opened by philosophy and sociology, economists considered ideology as opposed to science or truth, in a majority at least until the 1950-60s. Then the new definitional paradigm was to define ideology as opposed to rationality and especially to self-interest. This trend culminated in the 1980s and has then progressively regressed. But, for the two last decades, borrowing the definition of social scientists, a majority of economists have focused on the political/partisan dimension of ideology. Lastly, a minority of economic works have placed the notions of information and cognition at the heart of their approach to propose a procedural definition of ideology. From this evolution, we can notice that economists tended to move from a critical notion towards a neutral one. Indeed, initially defined as what is not scientific or rational, ideology was then defined in a non-evaluative way, as a mere political position or a way of treating information. We also noticed that economists tended to borrow the definitions of other disciplines, such as the *VS science* or the *partisan* definitions but were also able to propose original definitions such as *VS interest* and the *cognitive* approach.

Both tendencies are revealing of the way in which economics managed to make ideology an analytical tool that is in line with the standard economic theory or that could contribute to improve it. Indeed, by tending towards more and more neutral conceptions of ideology and by producing their own definitions, economists could contend with or circumvent the deadlocks of the standard economic theory. Indeed, it emerged to the content analysis that every definition referred to a specific theoretical debate. The *VS science* approach tackled the epistemic issue of the process of production of knowledge and the works within this approach tried to identify the potential biases inherent to researcher in the production of economic science. This first approach was the opportunity to reflect on the scientificity of economic science. In this vein, the *VS interest* definition focuses on one specific foundation of the economic theory, the assumption of self-interest of the rational choice model. Facing the dissonance of the theoretical predictions and observed ideological behaviors, a first “revisionist strategy” consisted in relaxing the assumption of self-interest by including additional arguments in the utility function thus increasing, in a tradition of economic imperialism, the explicative power of the rational choice model.

Contrary to the *VS interest approach*, the partisan approach, inherited from political science, was not devised to challenge an economic theoretical problem but had rather an empirical vocation. Nevertheless, it contributed, maybe unconsciously, to strongly question the standard behavioral model in economics. Emphasizing the permanence of the diversity or at least the duality of the patterns of interpretation of the world, it opposed the rational model that predicts the convergence of patterns led by an objective learning process. It implicitly suggests an alternative behavioral assumption in which the rationality can be subjective. Finally the cognitive approach examines a black hole of the economic science, through the formation of equilibrium and the persistence of sub-optimal equilibrium. It proposes to solve this puzzle by investigating the process of formation of individual and common beliefs. Focusing on the informative value of ideology in a uncertain world, this approach offered a second revisionist strategy to explain ideological behaviors with the rational choice theory. This approach seems to stand for a looming and fruitful approach and research agenda.

It appears from this study of the treatment of ideology a peculiar feature of the economic approach. While the concept of ideology has systematically put into question the basic behavioral assumptions of economics and even its scientificity, economists, at least a part of them tried, more or less successfully, to address the loopholes and to integrate ideology to the economic theory. That emphasizes a potential bias of our study that focuses mainly on the orthodox works published in the top-ranked reviews. Indeed, by focusing on the “mainstream” approaches of ideology, we analyzed more the way the economists “successfully” addressed the challenges than their failures, for instance, emphasized by North, who is not taken into account in our sample. That is why it would be interesting to compare these results with the works coming from other reviews, probably less optimistic about the ability of mainstream economists and especially the rational choice model to integrate the concept of ideology. We are totally aware of the potential limits of such a work, but in the absence of recent assessment on the works on ideology in economic literature, these preliminary conclusions are valuable and could enable scholars to orient their works on ideology and to look ahead.

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## 7. Appendix

Figure 1: Evolution of the total number of articles in social science that refer to ideology<sup>32</sup>




Figure 2: Evolution of the reviews that published articles on ideology<sup>33</sup>




Figure 3: Evolution of the number of the articles with ideology as an important topic in our sample<sup>34</sup>

<sup>32</sup> Articles available on JSTOR without discipline filter, which refer to the words "ideology", "ideologies" or "ideological" in their main text.

<sup>33</sup> the reviews of our sample that published articles that refer to the words "ideology", "ideologies" or "ideological" in their title, abstract or key-words.




Figure 4: Evolution of the relative part of the articles with ideology as an important topic in the reviews publishing articles on ideology<sup>35</sup>




Figure 5: Evolution of the relative part of the articles with ideology as an important topic in the total reviews of our sample<sup>36</sup>

<sup>34</sup> Articles that refer to the words “ideology”, “ideologies” or “ideological” in their title, abstract or key-words.

<sup>35</sup> Number of articles of figure 3 divided by the total number of reviews publishing these articles available for each decade.

<sup>36</sup> Number of articles of figure 3 divided by the number of reviews of our sample available for each decade




Figure 6: Evolution of the number of articles referring to ideology in the economic reviews<sup>37</sup>




Figure 7: Evolution of the number of articles referring to ideology in the economic reviews and in the total reviews of social science<sup>38</sup>

<sup>37</sup> Number of articles that refer to the words "ideology", "ideologies" or "ideological" in their main text in the economic reviews available on JSTOR.

<sup>38</sup> Number of articles that refer to the words "ideology", "ideologies" or "ideological" in their main text in the economic reviews and in the total reviews available on JSTOR.




Figure 8: Evolution the different categories of definitions




Table 1. Presentation of the reviews

Abbreviation	Name of Journals	Start	End
AER	American Economic Review	1911	2007
AJAE	American Journal of Agricultural Economics	1968	2004
AJPH	American Journal of Public Health	1975	2008
BPEA	Brookings Papers on Economic Activity	1970	2008
E	Econometrica	1933	2009
EDCC	Economic Development and Cultural Change	1952	2009
EG	Economic Geography	1925	2004

EHR	The Economic History Review	1927	2009
EJ	The Economic Journal	1891	2009
EJHET	European Journal of the History of Economic Thought	1993	2009
ET	Econometric Theory	1985	2010
ET	Economic Theory	1991	2009
Etrans	Economics of Transition	1999	2008
HPoE	History of Political Economy	1969	2010
IER	International Economic Review	1947	2007
ILRR	Industrial and Labor Relations Review	1947	2007
IRLE	International Review of Law and Economics	1981	2010
JCE	Journal of Comparative Economics	1977	2010
JDE	Journal of Development Economics	1974	2010
JE	Journal of Econometrics	1973	2010
JEG	Journal of Economic Geography	2001	2010
JEH	The Journal of Economic History	1941	2004
JEL	Journal of Economic Literature	1969	2008
JEP	Journal of Economic Perspectives	1987	2007
JET	Journal of Economic Theory	1969	2010
JHE	Journal of Health Economics	1982	2009
JIE	Journal of International Economics	1922	1996
JIE	Journal of Industrial Economics	1952	2009
JLabE	Journal of Labor Economics	1983	2007
JLE	Journal of Law and Economics	1958	2009
JLEO	Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization	1985	2008
JLS	Journal of Legal Studies	1972	2008
JMathE	Journal of Mathematical Economics	1974	2010
JMCB	Journal of Money, Credit & Banking	1969	2009
JMonE	Journal of Monetary Economics	1975	2010
JPE	The Journal of Political Economy	1892	2009
JPubE	Journal of Public Economics	1972	2010
JUE	Journal of Urban Economics	1974	2010
PC	Public Choice	1968	2008

QJE	Quarterly Journal of Economics	1886	2004
RAND	The RAND Journal of Economics	1984	2007
RES	Review of Economic Studies	1933	2006
REStat	Review of Economics and Statistics	1919	2004
SCW	Social Choice and Welfare	1984	2010
WBER	The World Bank Economic Review	1986	2002

### For Online Publication

Table 2. Presentation of the sample articles

YEAR	AUTHOR(S)	JOURNAL	ARTICLE TITLE	DEF CODE <sup>39</sup>
1932	Paul T. Homan	AER	An Appraisal of Institutional Economics	1
1939	Allan G. Gruchy	AER	The Economics of the National Resources Committee	1
1943	Jack Barbash	AER	Ideology and the Unions	no
1949	Joseph A. Schumpeter	AER	Science and Ideology	1
1950	Joseph A. Schumpeter	QJE	Wesley Clair Mitchell (1874-1948)	1
1954	Paul Streeten	QJE	Programs and Prognoses	1
1957	Reinhard Bendix	EDCC	A Study of Managerial Ideologies	5
1958	Mary Matossian	EDCC	Ideologies of Delayed Industrialization: Some Tensions and Ambiguities	4
1963	Kenneth Walker	EDCC	Ideology and Economic Discussion in China: Ma Yin-Ch'u on Development Strategy and His Critics	no
1963	Edward S. Mason	AER	Interests, Ideologies, and the Problem of Stability and Growth	2
1964	Richard H. Timberlake, Jr.	JEH	Ideological Factors in Specie Resumption and Treasury Policy	no
1968	Henry A. Landsberger	EDCC	Do Ideological Differences Have Personal Correlates? A Study of Chilean Labor Leaders at the Local Level	3
1968	Herman E. Daly	EDCC	The Population Question in Northeast Brazil: Its Economic and Ideological Dimensions	no
1969	Gerschenkron A.	AER	History of Economic Doctrines and Economic History	1
1971	Lawrence J. Lau, Bruno Frey	PC	Ideology, Public Approval, and Government Behavior	4
1973	Leon Smolinski	JPE	Karl Marx and Mathematical Economics	1
1974	David Harvey	EG	Population, Resources, and the Ideology of Science	1
1975	Mechanic, David	AJPH	Ideology, Medical Technology, and Health Care Organization in Modern Nations	no
1975	Ducan K. Foley	AER	Problems vs. Conflicts: Economic Theory and Ideology	5

<sup>39</sup> DEF CODE- 1 : VS Science; 2 : VS Interest; 3 : Partisan; 4 : Cognitive ; 5 : Marxist.

1976	Yony Sampaio	EDCC	The Population Question in Northeast Brazil: Its Economic and Ideological Dimensions: Comment	no
1977	Brunner, Karl; Meckling, William H	JMCB	The Perception of Man and the Conception of Government.	4
1978	Dennis L. Chinn	JCE	Income distribution in a chinese commune	no
1978	Joseph D. Reid, Jr.	JEH	Economic Burden: Spark to the American Revolution?	no
1979	James B. Kau, Paul H. Rubin	JLE	Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting	2
1980	Charles P. Cell	AJAE	Selective Incentives versus Ideological Commitment: The Motivation for Membership in Wisconsin Farm Organizations	2
1980	William L. Flinn, Frederick H. Buttel	AJAE	Sociological Aspects of Farm Size: Ideological and Social Consequences of Scale in Agriculture	no
1980	Oded Izraeli, Shalom Groll	EDCC	Implications of an Ideological Constraint: The Case of Hired Labor in the Kibbutz	2
1981	Elizabeth Fones-Wolf, Kenneth Fones-Wolf	ILRV	Voluntarism and Factional Disputes in the AFL: The Painters' Split in 1894-1900	no
1981	Richard A. Easterlin	JEH	Why Isn't the Whole World Developed?	no
1982	Hirschman, Albert O.	JEL	Rival Interpretations of Market Society: Civilizing, Destructive, or Feeble?	1
1982	James B. Kau, Donald Keenan, Paul H. Rubin	QJE	A General Equilibrium Model of Congressional Voting	3
1983	Anne Digby	EHR	Changes in the Asylum: The Case of York, 1777-1815	2
1983	Gur Ofer, Aaron Vinokur	JCE	The labor-force participation of married women in the Soviet Union: A household cross-section analysis	no
1984	E. J. Hobsbawm	EHR	Artisan or Labour Aristocrat?	no
1984	Joseph P. Kalt, Mark A. Zupan	AER	Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics	2
1984	James B. Kau, Paul H. Rubin	PC	Economic and Ideological Factors in Congressional Voting: The 1980 Election	2
1984	Erich Weede	PC	Democracy, Creeping Socialism, and Ideological Socialism in Rent-Seeking Societies	no
1985	Gur Ofer, Aaron Vinokur	JLabE	Work and Family Roles of Soviet Women: Historical Trends and Cross-Section Analysis	no
1985	Linda L. Johnson	PC	The Effectiveness of Savings and Loan Political Action Committees	2
1985	John E. Roemer	E	Rationalizing Revolutionary Ideology	2
1985	Donald Winch	EHR	Economic Liberalism as Ideology: The Appleby Version	no
1985	Alan Randall	AJAE	Methodology, Ideology, and the Economics of Policy: Why Resource Economists Disagree	1
1986	Derek Matthews	EHR	Laissez-faire and the London Gas Industry in the Nineteenth Century: Another Look	no
1986	Robert A. McGuire, Robert L. Ohsfeldt	JEH	An Economic Model of Voting Behavior over Specific Issues at the Constitutional Convention of 1787	2
1986	David S. Landes	JEH	What Do Bosses Really Do?	no

1986	Crain, M., Leavens D., Tollison R.	AER	Final Voting in Legislatures.	2
1987	Xu Jing'an	JCE	The stock-share system: A new avenue for China's economic reform	no
1987	John R. Lott Jr.	PC	Political Cheating	2
1988	Stuart Mestelman, David Feeny	PC	Does Ideology Matter?: Anecdotal Experimental Evidence on the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods	no
1988	Gerald Friedman	JEH	Strike Success and Union Ideology: The United States and France, 1880-1914	no
1989	Norbert Schulz, Joachim Weimann	PC	Competition of Newspapers and the Location of Political Parties	no
1989	Michael L. Davis, Philip K. Porter	PC	A Test for Pure or Apparent Ideology in Congressional Voting	2
1989	Marshall H. Medoff	PC	Constituencies, Ideology, and the Demand for Abortion Legislation	no
1989	William R. Dougan, Michael C. Munger	JLE	The Rationality of Ideology	4
1990	Nachum T. Gross	JEH	Israeli Economic Policies, 1948-1951: Problems of Evaluation	no
1990	Stanley D. Nollen, Harvey J. Iglarsh	PC	Explanations of Protectionism in International Trade Votes	2
1990	Joseph P. Kalt, Mark A. Zupan	JLE	The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators: Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions	2
1991	Ronald C. Griffin	AJAE	The Welfare Analytics of Transaction Costs, Externalities, and Institutional Choice	no
1991	Krishna K. Ladha	PC	A Spatial Model of Legislative Voting with Perceptual Error	2
1991	Alex Cukierman	PC	Asymmetric Information and the Electoral Momentum of Public Opinion Polls	3
1991	Julie A. Nelson, Steven M. Sheffrin	JEP	Economic Literacy or Economic Ideology?	no
1991	Rebecca B. Morton	PC	An Analysis of Legislative Inefficiency and Ideological Behavior	2
1991	William B. Walstad	JEP	A Flawed Ideological Critique	no
1991	Congleton, Roger	JPubE	Ideological Conviction and Persuasion in the Rent-Seeking Society	2
1992	Stratmann, Thomas <sup>1</sup>	AER	The effects of logrolling on congressional voting.	2
1992	Harrington, Joseph E., Jr	JPubE	The Role of Party Reputation in the Formation of Policy	3
1992	Scott J. Thomas, Bernard Grofman	PC	Determinants of Legislative Success in House Committees	3
1992	Simon P. Anderson, Gerhard Glomm	PC	Incumbency Effects in Political Campaigns	3
1992	William H. Kaempfer, Anton D. Lowenberg	PC	Using Threshold Models to Explain International Relations	2

1992	Robert L. Ohsfeldt, Stephan F. Gohmann	PC	The Economics of AIDS-Related Health Insurance Regulations: Interest Group Influence and Ideology	2
1992	Liliana R. Goldin	EDCC	Work and Ideology in the Maya Highlands of Guatemala: Economic Beliefs in the Context of Occupational Change	no
1992	Mark A. Zupan	PC	Measuring the Ideological Preferences of U.S. Presidents: A Proposed (Extremely Simple) Method	3
1993	Philip R. Jones, John G. Cullis	PC	Public Choice and Public Policy: The Vulnerability of Economic Advice to the Interpretation of Politicians	no
1993	Matthew B. Wright	PC	Shirking and Political Support in the U.S. Senate, 1964-1984	4
1993	Laura I. Langbein	PC	PACs, Lobbies and Political Conflict: The Case of Gun Control	3
1993	John A. Hird	PC	Congressional Voting on Superfund: Self-Interest or Ideology?	2
1993	Brain L. Goff, Kevin B. Grier	PC	On the (mis)Measurement of Legislator Ideology and Shirking	3
1993	Stuart Elaine MacDonald, George Rabinowitz	PC	Ideology and Candidate Evaluation	3
1993	James B. Kau, Paul H. Rubin	PC	Ideology, Voting, and Shirking	3
1993	Keith T. Poole, Thomas Romer	PC	Ideology, "Shirking", and Representation	3
1993	Rodney Fort, William Hallagan, Cyril Morong, Tesa Stegner	PC	The Ideological Component of Senate Voting: Different Principles or Different Principals?	2
1994	Bender, Bruce	JPubE	A Reexamination of the Principal-Agent Relationship in Politics	no
1994	Karl Wärneryd	PC	Partisanship as Information	4
1994	John Carey	PC	Political Shirking and the Last Term Problem: Evidence for a Party-Administered Pension System	2
1995	Sara Horrell, Jane Humphries	EHR	Women's Labour Force Participation and the Transition to the Male-Breadwinner Family, 1790-1865	no
1995	Yitchak Haberfeld	ILRV	Why Do Workers Join Unions? The Case of Israel	3
1995	Timothy J. Yeager	JEH	Encomienda or Slavery? The Spanish Crown's Choice of Labor Organization in Sixteenth-Century Spanish America	no
1995	Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg, Stewart J. Schwab	JLS	Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes	3
1995	Andrew J. Seltzer	JPE	The Political Economy of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938	2
1995	Lars-Erik Borge	PC	Economic and Political Determinants of Fee Income in Norwegian Local Governments	3

1995	Thomas A. Husted, Lawrence W. Kenny, Rebecca B. Morton	PC	Constituent Errors in Assessing Their Senators	3
1995	Giuseppe Eusepi	PC	Broadcasting System in Italy: Evolution and Perspectives	no
1995	David Brady, Edward P. Schwartz	PC	Ideology and Interests in Congressional Voting: The Politics of Abortion in the U.S. Senate	2
1996	Jim Tomlinson	EHR	Inventing 'Decline': The Falling behind of the British Economy in the Postwar Years	1
1996	Hebert, Robert	EJHET	Authority versus freedom in Quesnay's thought	no
1996	Levitt S.	AER	How Do Senators Vote? Disentangling the Role of Voter Preferences, Party Affiliation, and Senator Ideology	2
1996	Jose Edgardo Campos, Hadi Salehi Esfahani	WBER	Why and When Do Governments Initiate Public Enterprise Reform?	no
1996	Randall G. Holcombe, Russell S. Sobel	PC	The Stability of International Coalitions in United Nations Voting from 1946 to 1973	3
1996	Leo H. Kahane	PC	Senate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extension of the Fast- Track Trade Procedures: Prelude to NAFTA	3
1996	Rainald Borck	PC	Ideology and Interest Groups	2
1996	Hendrik P. Van Dalen, Otto H. Swank	PC	Government Spending Cycles: Ideological or Opportunistic?	2
1999	Joan Esteban, Debraj Ray	JET	Conflict and Distribution	3
1997	Matthew E. Kahn, John G. Matsusaka	JLE	Demand for Environmental Goods: Evidence from Voting Patterns on California Initiatives	no
1997	Wolgin J.	AER	The Evolution of Economic Policymaking in Africa	4
1997	James J. Heckman, James M. Snyder Jr.	RAND	Linear Probability Models of the Demand for Attributes with an Empirical Application to Estimating the Preferences of Legislators	3
1997	Helge Berger, Ulrich Woitek	PC	Searching for Political Business Cycles in Germany	3
1997	Thomas R. Cusack	PC	Partisan Politics and Public Finance: Changes in Public Spending in the Industrialized Democracies, 1955-1989	3
1997	Edward L. Glaeser	PC	Self-Imposed Term Limits	3
1997	Lars-Erik Borge, Jørn Rattsø	PC	Local Government Grants and Income Tax Revenue: Redistributive Politics in Norway 1900-1990	3
1997	Gary M. Anderson, Peter J. Boettke	PC	Soviet Venality: A Rent-Seeking Model of the Communist State	2
1997	Eric M. Uslaner	PC	If You Can't Please Everyone, Must You Only Please Yourself?: Personal or Party Ideologies and Senate Roll Call Voting	3
1998	Jonathan C. Brooks, A. Colin Cameron, Colin A. Carter	AJAE	Political Action Committee Contributions and U.S. Congressional Voting on Sugar Legislation	3
1998	Elisabeth R. Gerber, Rebecca B. Morton	JLEO	Primary Election Systems and Representation	3

1998	James W. Endersby, Steven E. Galatas	PC	British Parties and Spatial Competition: Dimensions of Party Evaluation in the 1992 Election	3
1998	Franz Urban Pappi, Gabriele Eckstein	PC	Voters' Party Preferences in Multiparty Systems and Their Coalitional and Spatial Implications: Germany after Unification	2
1998	Sun-Ki Chai	EDCC	Endogenous Ideology Formation and Economic Policy in Former Colonies	4
1998	Mario Pastore	JEH	Government, Taxation, Coercion, and Ideology: A Comment on Yeager	no
1998	Melvin J. Hinich, Michael C. Munger, Scott De Marchi	PC	Ideology and the Construction of Nationality: The Canadian Elections of 1993	4
1998	Jeffery A. Jenkins, Marc Weidenmier	PC	Ideology, Economic Interests, and Congressional Roll-Call Voting: Partisan Instability and Bank of the United States Legislation, 1811-1816	2
1998	Ayal Kimhi	EDCC	Institutional Environment, Ideological Commitment, and Farmers' Time Allocation: The Case of Israeli Moshavim	2
1999	Terry D. Van Doren, Dana L. Hoag, Thomas G. Field	AJAE	Political and Economic Factors Affecting Agricultural PAC Contribution Strategies	no
1999	In-Bong Kang, Kenneth Greene	PC	A Political Economic Analysis of Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA	2
1999	Douglas A. Irwin, Randall S. Kroszner	JLE	Interests, Institutions, and Ideology in Securing Policy Change: The Republican Conversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawley	2
1999	Nien-he Hsieh	EJHET	The conspicuous absence of examination questions concerning the Great Irish Famine: political economy as science and ideology.	no
2000	Caldwell, Peter C.	HPoE	Productivity, Value, and Plan: Fritz Behrens and the Economics of Revisionism in the German Democratic Republic	1
2000	Matt Spitzer, Eric Talley	JLS	Judicial Auditing	3
2000	Youngsik Lim	JLS	An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Justices' Decision Making	3
2000	Richard L. Revesz	JLS	Litigation and Settlement in the Federal Appellate Courts: Impact of Panel Selection Procedures on Ideologically Divided Courts	3
2000	Lawrence S. Rothenberg, Mitchell S. Sanders	PC	Legislator Turnout and the Calculus of Voting: The Determinants of Abstention in the U.S. Congress	2
2000	Günther G. Schulze, Heinrich W. Ursprung	PC	La donna e mobile -- or Is She? Voter Preferences and Public Support for the Performing Arts	2
2000	Helmut Seitz	PC	Fiscal Policy, Deficits and Politics of Subnational Governments: The Case of the German Laender	3

2001	Susannah Morris	EHR	Market Solutions for Social Problems: Working-Class Housing in Nineteenth-Century London	no
2001	Claudia Goldin	JEH	The Human-Capital Century and American Leadership: Virtues of the Past	no
2001	Bryan Caplan	JLE	What Makes People Think like Economists? Evidence on Economic Cognition from the "Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy"	3
2001	Sayed R. Mehmood, Daowei Zhang	AJAE	A Roll Call Analysis of the Endangered Species Act Amendments	2
2001	Arthur C. Brooks	PC	Who Opposes Government Arts Funding?	3
2001	Carlos D. Ramírez, Christian Eigen-Zucchi	PC	Understanding the Clayton Act of 1914: An Analysis of the Interest Group Hypothesis	3
2001	Reinhard Neck, Michael Getzner	PC	Politico-Economic Determinants of Public Debt Growth: A Case Study for Austria	3
2001	Bernard Grofman, William Koetzle, Samuel Merrill, Thomas Brunell	PC	Changes in the Location of the Median Voter in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1963-1996	3
2001	Fabrizio Balassone, Raffaella Giordano	PC	Budget Deficits and Coalition Governments	3
2001	Peter Bernholz	PC	Ideocracy and Totalitarianism: A Formal Analysis Incorporating Ideology	4
2002	Bryan Caplan	EJ	Systematically Biased Beliefs about Economics: Robust Evidence of Judgemental Anomalies from the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy	4
2002	Matthew O. Jackson, Boaz Moselle	JET	Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game	3
2002	David Brady, Judith Goldstein, Daniel Kessler	JLEO	Does Party Matter? An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in Three Institutional Settings	3
2002	Perotti, Roberto; Kontopoulos, Yianos	JPubE	Fragmented Fiscal Policy	3
2002	Emma Galli, Stefania P. S. Rossi	PC	Political Budget Cycles: The Case of the Western German Länder	3
2002	James B. Kau, Paul H. Rubin	PC	The Growth of Government: Sources and Limits	3
2002	A. J. McGann, Bernard Grofman, W. Koetzle	PC	Why Party Leaders Are More Extreme than Their Members: Modeling Sequential Elimination Elections in the U.S. House of Representatives	3
2002	Jon P. Nelson	REStat	"Green" Voting and Ideology: LCV Scores and Roll-Call Voting in the U.S. Senate, 1988-1998	3
2002	Gregory L. Bovitz, James N. Druckman, Arthur Lupia	PC	When Can a News Organization Lead Public Opinion?: Ideology versus Market Forces in Decisions to Make News	2

2003	David R. Green, Alastair Owens	EHR	Gentlewomanly Capitalism? Spinsters, Widows, and Wealth Holding in England and Wales, c. 1800-1860	no
2003	Ramon Faulí-Oller, Efe A. Ok, Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín	ET	Delegation and Polarization of Platforms in Political Competition	3
2003	Besley T. and case A.	JEL	Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States.	3
2003	Paul G. Mahoney	JLE	The Origins of the Blue-Sky Laws: A Test of Competing Hypotheses	2
2003	Dora L. Costa, Matthew E. Kahn	QJE	Cowards and Heroes: Group Loyalty in the American Civil War	no
2003	Henrik Christoffersen, Martin Paldam	PC	Markets and Municipalities: A Study of the Behavior of the Danish Municipalities	3
2003	Laura Langer	PC	Strategic Considerations and Judicial Review: The Case of Workers' Compensation Laws in the American States	2
2003	Vincy Fon, Francesco Parisi	PC	Litigation and the Evolution of Legal Remedies: A Dynamic Model	3
2003	Panu Poutvaara	PC	Party Platforms with Endogenous Party Membership	3
2003	Loren Brandt, Hongbin Li	JCE	Bank discrimination in transition economies: ideology, information, or incentives?	2
2004	James Davis	EHR	Baking for the Common Good: A Reassessment of the Assize of Bread in Medieval England	no
2004	Nakano, Takesshi	EJHET	Hegel's theory of economic nationalism: political economy in the Philosophy of Right *.	no
2004	Tavares, Jose;	JPubE	Does Right or Left Matter? Cabinets, Credibility and Fiscal Adjustments	3
2004	Bernhardt, Dan; Dubey, Sangita; Hughson, Eric	JPubE	Term Limits and Pork Barrel Politics	3
2004	Gökhan R. Karahan, William F. Shughart II	PC	Under Two Flags: Symbolic Voting in the State of Mississippi	2
2004	Russell S. Sobel, Gary A. Wagner	PC	Expressive Voting and Government Redistribution: Testing Tullock's 'Charity of the Uncharitable'	2
2004	Michele Santoni, Francesco Zucchini	PC	Does Policy Stability Increase the Constitutional Court's Independence? The Case of Italy during the First Republic (1956-1992)	3
2004	K. Kanthak	PC	Exclusive Committee Assignments and Party Pressure in the U.S. House of Representatives	3
2004	Sami Dakhli, John V. C. Nye	PC	Tax Britannica: Nineteenth Century Tariffs and British National Income	no
2004	David C. Nixon	JLEO	Separation of Powers and Appointee Ideology	2
2004	Stephen Nunez, Howard Rosenthal	JLEO	Bankruptcy "Reform" in Congress: Creditors, Committees, Ideology, and Floor Voting in the Legislative Process	2
2004	Claudio A. Bonilla	PC	A Model of Political Competition in the Underlying Space of Ideology	4

2004	Carl Grafton, Anne Permaloff	PC	Supplementing Zupan's Measurements of the Ideological Preferences of U.S. Presidents	3
2005	Rosselli, Annalisa	EJHET	Sraffa and the Marshallian tradition	1
2005	Alok K. Bohara, Alejandro Islas Camargo, Therese Grijalva, Kishore Gawande	JIE	Fundamental dimensions of U.S. trade policy	2
2005	A. Abiad, A. Mody	AER	Financial Reform: What Shakes It? What Shapes It?	3
2005	Ashish Chaturvedi	PC	Rigging Elections with Violence	2
2005	Christian Bjørnskov	PC	Does Political Ideology Affect Economic Growth?	3
2005	John M. de Figueiredo	JLEO	Strategic Plaintiffs and Ideological Judges in Telecommunications Litigation	3
2006	Jack, William; Lagunoff, Roger	JPubE	Dynamic Enfranchisement	no
2006	Anesi, Vincent	JPubE	Earmarked Taxation and Political Competition	no
2006	Albert Solé-Ollé	PC	The Effects of Party Competition on Budget Outcomes: Empirical Evidence from Local Governments in Spain	3
2006	Geneviève Tellier	PC	Public Expenditures in Canadian Provinces: An Empirical Study of Politico-Economic Interactions	3
2006	Joseph M. Whitmeyer	PC	Presidential Power over Supreme Court Decisions	3
2006	Ascensión Andina-Díaz	PC	Political Competition When Media Create Candidates' Charisma	2
2006	Peter Bernholz	PC	International Political System, Supreme Values and Terrorism	4
2006	Ronald Wintrobe	PC	Extremism, Suicide Terror, and Authoritarianism	2
2006	Bryan Caplan	PC	How Do Voters Form Positive Economic Beliefs? Evidence from the "Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy"	4
2006	Pushan Dutt, Devashish Mitra	JIE	Labor versus capital in trade-policy: The role of ideology and inequality	3
2006	William L. Anderson, Daniel A. Mizak	PC	Politics of Environmental Law: Political Ideology, Elitism or Urban-Rural Interests?	3
2007	Joseph L. Smith	JLEO	Presidents, Justices, and Deference to Administrative Action	3
2007	Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn	JLEO	Assessing Preference Change on the US Supreme Court	3
2007	Tonja Jacobi, Emerson H. Tiller	JLEO	Legal Doctrine and Political Control	3
2007	Dasgupta, Indraneel; Kanbur, Ravi	JPubE	Community and Class Antagonism	no
2007	Ascensión Andina-Díaz	PC	Reinforcement vs. Change: The Political Influence of the Media	3
2007	Keith T. Poole	PC	Changing Minds? Not in Congress!	3

2008	Peter Scott	EHR	Did Owner-Occupation Lead to Smaller Families for Interwar Working-Class Households?	no
2008	Morgan J. et Stocken P.	AER	Information Aggregation in Polls	1
2008	Bernhardt, Dan; Krasa, Stefan; Polborn, Mattias	JPubE	Political Polarization and the Electoral Effects of Media Bias	3
2008	Schultz, Christian	JPubE	Information, Polarization and Term Length in Democracy	3
2008	Laura McKenna, Antoinette Pole	PC	What Do Bloggers Do: An Average Day on an Average Political Blog	no
2008	Stanley L. Winer, Michael W. Tofias, Bernard Grofman, John H. Aldrich	PC	Trending Economic Factors and the Structure of Congress in the Growth of Government, 1930-2002	3
2008	Edward J. López, Carlos D. Ramírez	PC	Mr. Smith and the Economy: The Influence of Economic Conditions on Individual Legislator Voting	2
2008	Christian Bjørnskov	JDE	The growth–inequality association: Government ideology matters	3
2008	Santelli, John S	AJPH	Medical Accuracy in Sexuality Education: Ideology and the Scientific Process	1
2008	Eszter Hargittai, Jason Gallo, Matthew Kane	PC	Cross-Ideological Discussions among Conservative and Liberal Bloggers	3
2008	Amy McKay	PC	A Simple Way of Estimating Interest Group Ideology	2
2008	Anthony Bertelli, Lilliard E. Richardson, Jr.	PC	Ideological Extremism and Electoral Design. Multimember versus Single Member Districts	3
2008	Martimort, David; Semenov, Aggey;	JPubE	Ideological Uncertainty and Lobbying Competition	3
2008	Garrett R. Beeler Asay	PC	How Does Ideology Matter in the Spatial Model of Voting?	2
2009	Mehmet Ekmekci	JET	Manipulation through political endorsements	3
2009	Omer Gokcekus, Richard Fishler	AJAE	The Cotton Influence Index: An Examination of U.S. Cotton Subsidies	no
2009	Marc Debus	PC	Pre-Electoral Commitments and Government Formation	3
2009	Fabio Padovano, Roberto Ricciuti	PC	Political Competition and Economic Performance: Evidence from the Italian Regions	2
2009	Raffaella Santolini	PC	The Political Trend in Local Government Tax Setting	no
2009	Leif Helland, Rune J. Sørensen	PC	Geographical Redistribution with Disproportional Representation: A Politico-Economic Model of Norwegian Road Projects	3
2009	Germà Bel, Xavier Fageda	PC	Factors Explaining Local Privatization: A Meta-Regression Analysis	3
2009	Elodie Bertrand	PC	Empirical Investigations and Their Normative Interpretations: A Reply to Barnett and Block	1

2009	Niklas Potrafke	PC	Did Globalization Restrict Partisan Politics? An Empirical Evaluation of Social Expenditures in a Panel of OECD Countries	3
2009	Michael J. Ensley	PC	Individual Campaign Contributions and Candidate Ideology	3
2009	Masami Imai	PC	Ideologies, Vested Interest Groups, and Postal Saving Privatization in Japan	3
2009	Vincent Anesi, Philippe De Donder	EJ	Party Formation and Minority Ideological Positions	2
2010	Tomaso Duso, Jo Seldeslachts	JCE	The political economy of mobile telecommunications liberalization: Evidence from the OECD countries	2
2010	Hoff, K. et Stiglitz J.	AER	Equilibrium Fictions: A Cognitive Approach to Societal Rigidity.	4